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Abstract. Understanding how knowledge is created and propagates within groups is crucial
to explain how human populations have evolved through time. Anthropologists have relied on
different theoretical models to address this question. In this work, we introduce a mathemati-
cally oriented model that shares properties with individual based approaches, inhomogeneous
Markov chains and learning algorithms, such as those introduced in [F. Cucker, S. Smale, Bull.
Amer. Math. Soc, 39 (1), 2002] and [F. Cucker, S. Smale and D. X Zhou, Found. Comput.
Math., 2004]. After deriving the model, we study some of its mathematical properties, and
establish theoretical and quantitative results in a simplified case. Finally, we run numerical
simulations to illustrate some properties of the model.
Keywords: Individual based model, inhomogeneous Markov chains, convergence to equilib-
rium, numerical simulations, concentration inequalities, cultural evolution, language evolution,
cumulative culture.
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1. Introduction
1.1. On social learning. Computers, spaceships and scientific theories have not been invented
by single, isolated individuals. Instead, they result from a collective process in which innovations
are gradually added to an existing pool of knowledge, most often over multiple generations
[3, 15]. The ability to learn from others (social learning) is pivotal to that process because it
allows innovations to be shared and be built upon by other individuals.
This process, termed cumulative culture, has been extensively studied by evolutionary anthro-
pologists, both theoretically and experimentally [8, 14, 6, 12]. Most existing theoretical models,
however, rely on strong assumptions and omit important aspects of social dynamics. For instance,
previous models typically assume that individuals learn from the most skilled member of their
social group. Yet, in real life, many reasons can prevent this strategy to come about: individuals
might fail to evaluate each other’s skills and hierarchical or spatial structures might preclude
individuals from accessing to the most useful sources of social information, among others.
The aim of this work is to develop a more general mathematical model of knowledge evolution
by relaxing hypotheses and incorporating more realistic forms of social interaction dynamics,
such as those taking place in hierarchically or spatially structured populations.
1.2. Outline of the paper. In this work, we develop a new mathematical model that aims
to describe the dynamics of knowledge creation and propagation among interacting individuals.
The model is properly introduced and simple applications are given in Section 2. In Section 3, we
TR was partially funded by Labex CEMPI (ANR-11-LABX-0007-01) and ANR Project MoHyCon (ANR-
17-CE40-0027-01). MD has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement number 748310. Support from the ANR-Labex In-
stitute for Advanced Study in Toulouse is acknowledged.
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study some of the mathematical properties of the model, and establish theoretical, quantitative
results in a simplified case describing the evolution of knowledge among interacting individuals.
Finally, we develop a numerical method to simulate our model in Section 4. This method allows
us to run numerical analyses of the model in cases where we do not have analytical results and to
present numerical illustrations of the classical model of [5] on the evolution on language, which
is contained in our model.
Acknowledgments. TR would like to thanks Mylène Maida for useful discussions on the in-
homogeneous Markov chain structure of the model. LM would like to thanks Dorian Ni for his
feedback on the model.
2. Presentation of the mathematical model
In this section, we shall present the model describing the evolution of knowledge within a finite
population. Many different definitions of knowledge have been proposed. Here, we consider that
knowledge results from conceptualizations that appropriately reflect the structure of the world
and model conceptualization as functions linking a set of possible experiences to a set of possible
concepts. We call these functions knowledge-like functions.
Time is supposed discrete. At each time step the knowledge-like function of individuals changes
according to a learning dynamic that depends on both social and individual learning. Our model
is an extension of the model of Cucker, Smale and Zhou describing the evolution of language [5],
and can be seen as an hybrid between a learning algorithm [4] and an individual based model
[2, 1].
We suppose that each individual influences each other through a social learning matrix Λ ∈
MN (R). This matrix depends on both the structure of the population (e.g. a professor has
a strong impact on its students, while students have less impact on their professor) and the
credibility that each individual grants to each other. These influences are described by a structure
matrix Γ ∈MN (R) and a credibility matrix C ∈MN (R), respectively. Knowledge-like functions
also evolve by individual learning which is described as a stochastic process that we will detail
in the following. The learning algorithm then takes into account both social and individual
learning.
Let us first start with some useful notations that we shall use in the following:
• The space of square matrices of size N > 0 with coefficients in K will be denoted by
MN (K).
• The vector of RN composed of 1s will be denoted by e:
(2.1) e = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ RN .
• The distance from a function f to a set X is defined by
d(f,X ) = inf
g∈X
d(f, g).
2.1. Modeling Knowledge.
Definition 1. A knowledge setting K is a triple (E , C,F) where :
(1) E is a closed and bounded subset of Rn.
(2) C ⊂ El with l ∈ N∗, E an euclidean space, and 0 ∈ C.
(3) F is a subset of the set of the functions from E to C.
The set E represents all the possible experiences, and C represents all the concepts (an illus-
tration is presented in Fig 1).
Definition 2. A knowledge-like function f ∈ F is a function from the experience set E to the
concept set C.
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Each knowledge-like function represents represents the knowledge of one individual. Let e be
in E , when there is a c ∈ C such as f(e) = c and c 6= 0, we say that the knowledge-like function
conceptualizes e. We assume that individuals conceptualize all experiences they go through.
Elements that are not conceptualized (i.e. not experienced) by individuals are sent to the zero
of the set C by their knowledge-like function.
Example. The knowledge-like function associated to colors. Let E be [0, 1000] ⊂ R representing
the set of wavelengths in nanometers. We remind that [380, 750] is the set of the visible spectrum.
An individual associates each element of E to a color as shown in Figure 1. The set of concepts
C contains the name of the color and 0. In this case E is a continuous space and C is a discrete
space.
A knowledge-like function associates a color to each wavelength, or 0 if the individual has not
conceptualized this color. For example f defined below is a knowledge-like function.
(2.2) f ′(e) =

purple if e ∈ [380, 430],
blue if e ∈ [430, 520],
green if e ∈ [520, 565],
yellow if e ∈ [565, 610],
red if e ∈ [610, 750],
0 otherwise.
Figure 1. Illustration of a knowledge-like function of the visible spectrum.
The arrows point to the color associated with each wavelength and illustrate the
knowledge-like function f (2.3).
Remark 1. In Japanese the kanji 青 (ao) names both colors green and blue. As in other
languages, the Japanese language did not differentiate between these two colors at the beginning
of its history. This language could be modeled by the knowledge-like function f’:
(2.3) f(e) =

purple if e ∈ [380, 430],
green if e ∈ [430, 565],
yellow if e ∈ [565, 610],
red if e ∈ [610, 750],
0 otherwise.
This knowledge-like function f ′ is different from f given in (2.2). Within the same population,
individuals can have different knowledge-like functions.
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2.2. Individual Based Model. Let N be the number of individuals in the population. Each
individual i is associated with a knowledge-like function ki ∈ F .
Definition 3. A structure matrix Γ = (γij)1≤i,j≤N is a square matrix of size N describing the
influence that individuals have on each other. More precisely for each (i, j) ∈ {1, ..., N}2, γij ∈ R
describes the strength of the influence of j on i.
Remark 2. For all i ∈ {1, ..., N} the greater the γii, the less the individual i will be influenced
by others. So γii can be interpreted as the inertia of the individual i.
Examples of structure matrices.
• We consider a population of N individuals structured in age, sorted such that individual
1 is the youngest and N the oldest. It has been shown that older individuals tend to
have a higher inertia [7], which can be modelled by the condition γ11 < ... < γNN .
• Let us consider the relationship between a parent and her offspring. The offspring learns
a lot from her parent but the situation is not symmetric. Let s ∈ (0, 1) describes the
influence of a parent on her offspring. We have
Γ =
(
1 0.1
s 1− s
)
.
• We consider now the relationship between two students and their professor. Because
of her status, the professor has a high influence on her students, while being very little
influenced by them. Assuming that the relationship between the students is symmetric,
we have
Γ =
1 0.1 0.11 0.2 0.2
1 0.2 0.2
 .
2.3. Likelihood landscape. In our model, some conceptualizations (i.e. knowledge-like func-
tions) appropriately reflect the structure of the world, while other do not. For instance, in an
environment in which blue berries are safe to eat while green berries are unsafe, color categoriza-
tions that discriminate between blue and green are superior because they appropriately capture
the structure of the environment. Individuals don’t know a priori how to categorize their en-
vironment. An individual who, by chance, only ever ate blue/safe berries might consider that
discriminating between blue and green makes no sense. Yet, an individual who got sick after eat-
ing green/unsafe berries is likely to refine her color conceptualization to avoid being sick again.
Sometimes, alternative and irreconcilable conceptualizations are equally likely. As an illustration
let us consider the shape illustrated in figure 2. One might consider that it represents (1) two
faces (in black) or (2) one cup (in white). Additional observations will not allow individuals to
decide whether one conceptualization is more likely than the other.
In our model, we assume that individuals evaluate the likelihood of their conceptualization
according to their own experience. To do so we define a likelihood landscape as following:
Definition 4. ∀c ∈ C, we define a function
L(·, c) : E → [0, 1],
e 7→ L(e, c).
with
∀e ∈ E , L(e, 0) = 1
2
.
The map L is called the likelihood landscape.
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Figure 2. On this figure one may see two faces (in black) or a cup (in white).
Image courtesy of Bryan Derksen, under license CC BY-SA 3.0
For all e, c in E × C, L(e, c) represents how well the concept c explain the experience (or
observation) x.
Examples of likelihood landscapes.
• Let us consider the evolution of two different concepts in a population: flat earth (F ), and
round earth (R). Individuals can have experiences where the Earth seems flat (f) and
others where the Earth seems round (r) (seeing a picture of the Earth, a boat vanishing
behind the horizon, etc). In this case E = {f, r} and C = {0, F, C}. We define the
likelihood landscape as :
L(e, F ) =
{
1 if e = f,
0 if e = r,
and
L(e,R) =
{
1 if e = f,
1 if e = r.
When the earth seems flat (f) the earth could be flat or round (because round surfaces
can appear flat when observed up close), so both concepts (F and R) are likely. However,
when the earth seems round only the concept that the earth is round is likely.
• Let us consider again the example of color developed above (Fig. 1), where E is the set
of all wavelengths of the visible spectrum and C is the set of colors. Moreover, let us
consider that it does not make sense to discriminate between colors. In that case, we
would define the likelihood landscape as L(e, c) = 1 for all (e, c) ∈ E × C \ {0}.
2.4. Credibility. In addition to the population structure Γ from Definition 3, the influence of
individuals on each other also depends on their credibility, through the credibility matrix C. The
level of credibility attributed to an individual by another depends on both the knowledge-like
functions, and the likelihood landscape.
More precisely, cij describes the credibility individual i attributes to individual j. If the
credibility given to individual j by individual i is high relatively to that one attributed to other
individuals (including herself), that means that individual i is more prone to adopt individual j’s
conceptualization. We will describe in Section 2.6 how this adoption changes one’s knowledge-
like function. We also consider that the credibility cii that an individual i gives to its own
categorization can be affected by her own new experiences. In other words, individuals are able
of self-criticism. The lower the self-credibility, the more likely an individual is to be influenced
by other individuals (self-credibility directly affects an individual’s inertia).
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Definition 5. A credibility matrix C = (cij)1≤i,j≤N is a square matrix of size N defined by:
(2.4) cij = max(c˜ij , cmin),
where cmin ≥ 0 is a fixed parameter , and
(2.5) c˜ij =
1
1 + 1{i 6=j}
∫
c∈kj(X) dc
exp
(∫
e∈E
ln
(
L(e, kj(e))1{ki(e) 6=0}
)
de
)
.
Remark 3. The term
(
1 + 1{i 6=j}
∫
c∈kj(X) dc
)−1
penalizes individuals who use on a wider range
of concepts, which means that conceptualization that rely on smaller number of concepts are more
likely to spread. The second term corresponds to the evaluation of the likelihood of the knowledge-
like function of individual j on the experiences experienced by individual i. Note that for all e,
L(e, 0) = 12 (corresponding to cases where individual j has not experienced e), which decreases
individual’s credibility. This means that an individual i considers an individual j less credible if
j has not experienced an experience individual i has gone through.
Finally, the constant cmin corresponds to the minimal credibility: if cmin > 0, individuals with
low credibility can still influence other individuals.
Remark 4. If the set E contains a finite number of elements the credibility formula reduces to
c˜ij =
1
1 + 1{i 6=j}
∫
c∈kj(X) dc
∏
e∈E
1ki(e) 6=0L(e, kj(e)),
namely, the second part of the formula is similar to a measure of likelihood in probability theory
[10]. In this formula, associating few experiences with unlikely concepts penalizes credibility a
lot.
Application to the round vs. flat earth example. Let E = {f1, f2, f3, r1, r2} and C = {0, F,R},
together with cmin := 0. For any i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, fi are experiences where the Earth as likely to
be flat as it is round (e.g. a human watching the horizon), and r1, r2 are experiences where the
Earth is unlikely to be flat and likely to be round. We consider a population of 4 individuals
with different knowledge-like functions k1, k2, k3 and k4 such as:
k1(e) =
{
F if e = f1,
0 otherwise, k2(e) =
{
F if e = f1 or e = r1,
0 otherwise ,
k3(e) =
{
R if e = f1 or e = r1,
0 otherwise, k4(e) =
 F if e = f1,R if e = r1,
0 otherwise.
We now compute the credibility matrix,
C =

1 1 1 1
1
2 0 1 1
1
2 0 1
1
2
1
2 0 1 1
 .
Let us normalize C such that its lines sum up to 1, in order to easily read the influences on
an individual j in the row i:
C =

1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
5 0
2
5
2
5
1
4 0
1
2
1
4
1
5 0
2
5
2
5
 .
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Individual #1 has only experienced f1, she judges the other individuals (and herself) regarding
that sole experience. All individuals associate f1 with an appropriate conceptualization. So
individual #1 gives the same credibility to all individuals. Individuals #2, 3 and 4 all have
experienced f1 and r1. They evaluate individual #1 as less credible than themselves because
#1 has not experienced r1. Individual #3 and 4 evaluate #2 as not credible at all because
she associates r1 with a concept that is not probable anymore (i.e. the earth is flat while their
experience shows it is round). #2 judges herself not credible because she associates r1 with
an unlikely concept. Individual #3 evaluates #4 as less credible than herself because #4 uses
several concepts (in our model, less parsimonious conceptualizations are penalized).
2.5. Social learning. The social learning matrix Λ ∈ MN (R) represents the influence of indi-
viduals on each other. This matrix captures the effect of the structure of the population described
in Γ and the effect due to credibility C.
The influence of individual j on i depends on the structural influence γij of j on i, and on
the credibility cij that i gives to j. We shall assume in this work that these phenomena are
multiplicative.
Definition 6. The social learning matrix Λ = (λij)1≤i,j≤N is a square matrix of size N defined
by:
(2.6) λij =
{
γijcij∑N
l=1 γilCil
if
∑N
l=1 γilCil 6= 0,
1/N otherwise.
.
2.6. Dynamics. Finally, we consider a dynamical, discrete time model: knowledge-like functions
evolve over time, altogether with associated quantities such as individuals’ credibility. Let us
denote by kt := (kt1, ..., ktN ) ∈ FN the state of the population at time t > 0. As time evolves,
individuals modify their conceptualization by the learning algorithm presented in [4]:
(2.7) Sti 7→ kt+1i ,
which computes knowledge-like function from a sample
(2.8) Sti = {(ei,t1 , ci,t1 ), ..., (ei,tm , ci,tm )}.
The sampling Sti is done using the probability measure ρi,t defined in (2.9). For each individual
i, the components of Sti represent the influences that will shape the knowledge of i at the next
step. The elements of Sti can come from social or individual learning.
Definition 7. Let us denote by τ ≥ 0 the proportion of individual learning, fixed and independent
on i. The sampling measure is defined by
(2.9) ρi,t = (1− τ)ρi,tΛ + τρi,tI ,
where ρi,tΛ and ρ
i,t
I are two probability measures representing the effects of social and individual
learning respectively, and defined below.
Definition 8. The probability measure ρi,tΛ representing social learning is defined by:
(2.10) ρi,tΛ (e, c) ∝
N∑
j=1
λtij1{kj(e)=c},
where λtij describes the influence of the individual j on the individual i through 2.6 at time t.
According to (2.10), drawing an element (e, kti(e)) using the probability measure ρ
i,t
Λ is equiv-
alent to randomly drawing an individual i weighted by the coefficient (λtij)1≤j≤N , and randomly
choosing an experience e in E .
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Definition 9. The probability measure ρi,tI representing individual learning is given by
(2.11)

∫
c∈C
ρi,tI (e, c) dc ∝
∫
e′∈E
1{kti(e′)6=0}1{e∈E} exp−
‖e− e′‖2
2σ2E
de′,
ρi,tI (c|e) ∝ 1{c∈C} exp−
‖c− f ti (e)‖2
2σ2C
,
where ρ(c|e) denotes the conditional probability measure on C, defined for every (e, c) ∈ E × C,
and every integrable function φ by∫
E×C
φ(e, c) dρ =
∫
E
(∫
C
φ(e, c) dρ(c|e)
)
dρE .
In this last expression, ρE denotes the marginal probability measure on E, namely
ρE(e) := ρ(pi−1(e)), ∀e ∈ E ,
where pi : E × C → E is the projection on E.
The individual learning phase is then equivalent for each individual i to draw an element e′
experienced by i and to draw an experience e following a normal law centered and concentrated
on e′. Because of the shape of this probability law, individuals tend to explore the set E close
to the elements they already explored (namely, innovating). The concept c is drawn following a
probability law centered and concentrated on kti(e).
Definition 10. The learning algorithm finally computes the knowledge-like function at the next
time step using a least-square procedure [4]
kt+1i ∈ arg min
k
∑
(e,c)∈Sti
(k(e)− c)2.
3. The case of globally shared knowledge: convergence without individual
learning
In this section, we are interested in the convergence of the learning dynamics with high
probability to a common shared conceptualization among individuals, i.e. when everybody carries
the same knowledge-like function k. This result is obtained assuming no individual learning : in
all this section, we shall assume that the rate of individual learning τ = 0. The more realistic
case where individuals also learn individually is explored below using numerical simulations.
One step idealistic processes. In order to establish the main result, let us decompose the stochastic
process kt into two other processes that we shall analyze separately.
Definition 11. Let us define the application T : F × N 7→ F by
(3.1) T (f, t) = Λtf.
We can then define the one step deterministic idealistic process as
(3.2) KtT := T (kt, t), K0T = k0 ∈ FN .
Using these idealistic processes, the time evolution of the knowledge-like function is given by
(3.3) kt = ∆kt +KtT ,
where ∆kt = kt −KtT .
Definition 12. LetMF = {(k, ..., k), k ∈ F} be the space of all the common shared conceptual-
izations.
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We first prove the contraction of the idealized process KtT from (3.1) in the spaceMF using
some algebraic properties of primitive matrices, as well as results about inhomogeneous Markov
chains. Secondly, we shall prove the convergence of the process ∆kt with high probability using
learning theory. Then, under certain hypothesis (such as τ = 0), we prove the convergence of kt
towards the setMF with high probability.
3.1. Primitive matrices and their applications. The behavior of processes is mainly driven
by the influence matrix Λ. In this Section, we study the relationship between the properties of
the influence matrix and the interactions taking place within the population.
Definition 13. A matrix A ∈ MN (R) is said to be primitive if A ≥ 0 and if ∃k ∈ N∗ such as
Ak > 0.
Definition 14. Let A ∈MN (R). Let i,j be in {1, ..., N},
• We say that i communicates with j (denoted i A−→ j) if there exists n ≥ 0 and i1, ..., in ∈
{1, ..., N} such that
aii1
n−1∏
l=1
(ailil+1)ainj > 0.
If i does not communicate with j we write i9 j.
• We say that i communicates with j with k intermediates if there exists i1, ..., ik ∈ {1, ..., N}
such that
aii1
k∏
l=1
(ailil+1)aikj > 0,
and if there exists not i1, ..., ik−1 ∈ {1, ..., N} such that
aii1
k−1∏
l=1
(ailil+1)aik−1j > 0,
• Let I, J ∈P({1, ..., N}). We say that I A−→ J if
∃i, j ∈ I × J such that i A−→ j.
If A is a primitive matrix of size N , for each i, j in {1, ..., N}, i→ j. Moreover if there is k such
that Ak > 0, then for each i, j in {1, ..., N} i communicates with j with at most k intermediates.
Examples. Let us consider a matrix A defined by
A =

1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
 .
As we can see on the graph of the matrix A (Fig. 3), every individual communicates with each
other with at most 3 intermediates. Then, A is a primitive matrix, because
1234
Figure 3. Graph representing the matrix A.
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A3 =

4 5 3 1
5 7 6 3
3 6 5 7
1 3 5 4
 > 0.
However the converse is not true. Indeed if one considers the matrix
B =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
then 1 → 2 and 2 → 1 (see fig. 4). Nevertheless, B is not a primitive matrix because for all
12
Figure 4. Graph representing the matrix B.
k ∈ N,
B =
{
B if k is odd,
I2 if k is even.
According to Perron-Frobenius theorem, one has
Proposition 1. Let A ∈MN (R) be a primitive stochastic matrix. 1 is an eigenvalues of A, and
all the other eigenvalues are less than 1 in modulus.
We can now establish results relating graphs and eigenvalues of matrices:
Proposition 2. Let A be a stochastic matrix of size N , if
∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, i A−→ j or j A−→ i,
holds then 1 is an eigenvalue of A, and its multiplicity is 1.
Proof. We suppose that 1 is not an eigenvalue of multiplicity 1 of A. Since A is a stochastic
matrix one has Ae = e with e given by (2.1), so 1 is an eigenvalue of A. In particular, its order
of multiplicity is bigger than 1, and there exists X ∈ RN \ Re such that AX = X.
Let P be a permutation matrix such that the coordinates of the vector PX are ranked from
the lowest to the highest. Let A′ = PTAP and X ′ = PTX. Let nl and nh be respectively
the number of coordinates equals to the lowest and to the highest coordinates values. We have
nl ≥ 1, nh ≥ 1 and nl + nh ≤ N .
First case : nl + nh = N
AX = X ⇐⇒ A′X ′ = X ′.
=⇒ ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N},
N∑
j=1
a′ijX
′
j = X
′
i.
=⇒
{ ∀i ∈ {1, ..., nl},∀j ∈ {nl + 1, ..., N}, a′ij = 0,
∀i ∈ {nl + 1, ..., N},∀j ∈ {1, ..., nl}, a′ij = 0.
=⇒ ∃(B,C) ∈Mnl(R)×Mnh(R), A =
(
B 0
0 C
)
.
So 1 9 N et N 9 1 with the matrix A′. Let i = σ−1(1) and j = σ−1(N), we have i9 j and
j 9 i with the matrix A.
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Second case : nl + nh < N Let G1 = {1, ..., nl}, G2 = {nl + 1, ..., N − nl}, and G3 = {N − nh +
1, ..., N}.
AX = X ⇐⇒ A′X ′ = X ′.
=⇒ ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N},
N∑
j=1
a′ijX
′
j = X
′
i.
=⇒
{ ∀i ∈ {1, ..., nl},∀j ∈ {nl + 1, ..., N}, a′ij = 0,
∀i ∈ {N − nh + 1, ..., N},∀j ∈ {1, ..., nl}, a′ij = 0.
=⇒ ∃(B,C,D,E, F ), A =
 B 0 0C D E
0 0 F
 .
As shown on the figure 5, G1 9 G3 and G3 9 G1.
G2
G1 G3
Figure 5. Illustration of the influence relationship between the three clusters
G1, G2, and G3
We conclude as before.

3.2. Eigenvalues of the matrix of influence Λ. In this Section we study the the quantitative
properties of the eigenvalues of the influence matrix, in order to understand the dynamics of the
idealized process KtT .
Let Γ and C be respectively the structure and credibility matrices defined in Def. 3 and
equation (2.5). By construction, C is a stochastic matrix. The structure matrix Λ is defined
according to (2.6) by
λij =
{
γijcij∑N
l=1 γilCil
if
∑N
l=1 γilCil 6= 0,
1/N otherwise.
Proposition 3. If for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, one has i Γ−→ j or j Γ−→ i, and the credibility matrix
C > 0, then for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, i Λ−→ j or j Λ−→ i.
Proof. ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, γij > 0 =⇒ λij > 0 using (2.6). Thus ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, i Γ−→
j or j Γ−→> 0 =⇒ i Λ−→ j or j Λ−→ i.

Lemma 1. If Γ is primitive and cmin > 0, then Λ is a primitive matrix.
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Proof. Γ is primitive so there exists k ∈ N such that Γk > 0. In particular,
∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, γkij > 0 ⇐⇒ ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N},∑
0≤l1,...,lk−1≤N
γil1γl1l2 ...γlk−1j > 0,
⇐⇒ ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N},∃l1, ..., lk−1 ∈ {1, ..., N},
γil1γl1l2 ...γlk−1j > 0.
Moreover C > 0 implies that ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, γij > 0. One can then conclude that λij > 0. 
Lemma 2. Let us assume that Γ > 0. If cmin > 0, the social learning matrix Λ is bounded by
below: there exists mλ > 0 such that ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, λij ≥ mλ.
Proof. Let us set mγ = mini,j γij . Since γij > mγ for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, one has that
λij > 1∑N
l=0 γilCil=0
1
N
+ 1∑N
l=0 γilCil 6=0
mγcmin
N(1−Nmγ)
.
It is then enough to choose
mλ = min
(
1
N
,
mγcmin
N(1−Nmγ)
)
.

Lemma 3. Let Λ be a stochastic matrix of size N that is bounded by below by mλ as in Lemma
2. Let us consider the sorted collection (αi)i=1...N of its eigenvalues:
α1 = 1 > |α2| ≥ ... ≥ |αN |.
Then there exists a universal constant 0 < Mλ < 1 such that
∀i ∈ {2, ..., N}, |αi| ≤ 1−Mλ.
Proof. Let A = {A ∈ MN (R),∀i ∈ {1, ..., N},∑ aij = 1,∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, aij ≥ mλ}. Being
composed of stochastic matrices, the set A is bounded (by 1) for the norms induced by both
the 1 and ∞ vector norms on RN . Moreover, it is closed by construction. In particular, A is a
compact subset ofMN (R).
Let
L : MN (R)→ CN
A 7→ Sp(A),
the application that returns the eigenvalues of a matrix, sorted in a nonincreasing (in modulus)
order. According to the Theorem II.5.1 of [9], L is a continuous function on the set of stochastic
matrices. In particular, A being compact, the numerical range of L,
R(L) := {L(A),∀A ∈ A} ⊂ CN ,
is also compact. Continuous function reach their bounds on compact sets, so that one can take
Mλ = 1− sup
L∈A
{|µ2|, µ ∈ R(L)}
= 1−max{|µ2|, µ ∈ R(L)}.

MODELING KNOWLEDGE EVOLUTION 13
3.3. Contraction of a stochastic primitive matrix. We shall now study in this section
properties of stochastic primitive matrices, in order to understand the behavior of the process
KtT .
Lemma 4. Let A ∈MN (R) be a stochastic matrix that is bounded by below by mA as in 2. Let
M := Re be the eigenspace associated to the eigenvalue 1 and W the eigenspace associated to
the remaining eigenvalues. One has
(1) RN =M⊕W, both spaces being stable by A;
(2) There is a norm ‖·‖ on W and a distance d on RN such that for all (xM, xW) ∈M⊕W,
d(xW ,M) = ‖xW‖,(3.4)
d(xM + xW) = d(xW ,M),(3.5)
d(A(xM + xW),M) ≤ (1−NmA)d(xM + xW ,M).(3.6)
Proof. (1) Classical decomposition result.
(2) We take ‖xW‖ = maxi,j∈{1,...,N}{|xW,i − xW,j |} for all xW ∈ W. The matrix A being
stochastic, one can use results on inhomogeneous Markov chains together (namely The-
orem 3.1 in [16]) together with the upper bound (3) on the eigenvalues of A to have
that
‖AxW‖ ≥ (1−NmA) ‖xW‖.
Let x = xM + xW and y = yM + yW be inM⊕W, we define d as
d(x, y) = ‖xM − yM‖2 + ‖xW − yW‖,
with ‖ · ‖2 being the euclidean norm on RN .

Remark 5. This result is inspired from the Lemma 1 from [5], and has similar conclusions.
Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that with its set of hypotheses, the original result from [5]
is wrong. Indeed, being only stochastic and weakly irreducible is not enough to have the existence
of a norm with the desired, precise contraction property (ii)-(c). For example,
Λ :=
 0 1/2 1/23/4 0 1/4
1/8 7/8 0

is a stochastic, weakly irreducible matrix which has 2 complex eigenvalues, preventing the validity
of (ii)-(c). Our set of hypotheses, as well as our new proof, prevent this.
Corollary 1. If A ∈ MN (R) is as in Lemma 4, M := Re be the eigenspace associated to the
eigenvalue 1 and W the eigenspace associated to the remaining eigenvalues:
(1) Then FN =M⊕W, both spaces being stable by A;
(2) There is a norm ‖ · ‖ on W and a distance d on RN such that, for all fM ∈M and for
all fW ∈ W,
d(fW ,M) =
√√√√∫
E
l∑
i=1
‖fW,i(e)‖2 de,
d(fM + fW ,M) = d(fW ,M),
d(A(fM + fW),M) ≤ (1−NmA) d(fM + gW ,M).
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Proof. Let f = fM + fW and g = gM + gW inM⊕W, we define as
d(g,M) =
√√√√∫
E
l∑
i=1
(‖fM,i(e)− gM(e),i‖22 + ‖fW,i(e)− gW,i(e)‖2) de,

Corollary 2. Let A ∈MN (R) as in Lemma 4, and f ∈ FN such that f = fM+ fW ∈M⊕W.
There exists a distance d on F such that
d(Af, fM) ≤ (1−NmA) d(f, fM).
Proof. Consequence of the previous corollary. 
We recall that the application T : F×N 7→ F and the processKtT are defined by T (f, t) = Λtf
and KtT = T (kt, t). This may be interpreted as an idealistic step of learning. Moreover, we
assumed that τ = 0, namely no individual learning occurs in the model.
Theorem 1. If Γ > 0, and the minimum credibility cmin > 0 is fixed, then for all times t, there
exists a distance dΛt and m > 0 independent on t such that
d(Kt+1T , k
t
M) ≤ (1−m) d(kt, ktM),
where ktM is the projection of k
t onM.
Proof. Consequence of lemmas 1 and 2, and corollary 2. 
We define an idealistic deterministic process Kt by Kt+1 = ΛtKt and K0 = k0. Theorem 1
implies that the idealistic, deterministic process converges to a common shared knowledge:
Corollary 3. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, there exist (K0M,K
0
W) in M⊗W such that
K0 = K0M +K
0
W . Then,
lim
t→+∞(K
t,K0M) = 0.
3.4. Learning theory. The results presented in this part are inspired by [4]. This article deals
with the inference of functions to match with random samples. In our case, the functions are
knowledge-like functions and samples come from social learning and individual learning. Never-
theless, our theoretical results shall only deal with the case where individuals learn from social
sources only (under the hypothesis τ = 0). The results of this theory implies the convergence of
the process ∆kt with high probability.
3.4.1. Sample error. We study the learning process from random samples governed by the prob-
ability measure ρ on Z = E × C. We recall that E is a compact subset of Rn, and that C is a
subset of an euclidean space containing zero.
Definition 15. We define the least square error of f as
ε(f) =
∫
Z
‖f(e)− c‖2C dρ,
for f : E → C, where ‖ · ‖C is a norm on C associated with the inner product 〈·, ·〉C of the ambient
euclidean space El.
Proposition 4. For every f : E → C,
ε(f) =
∫
E
‖f(e)− fρ(e)‖2C dρE + ε(fρ),
where fρ(e) :=
∫
C cdρ(c|e), for any e ∈ E.
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Proof. Adding and subtracting fρ yields
ε(f) =
∫
Z
‖f(e)− fρ(e)‖2 dρ+
∫
Z
‖fρ(e)− c‖2 dρ+ 2
∫
Z
〈f(e)− fρ(e), fρ(e)− c〉C dρ
= A+ ε(fρ) + 2B.
We have
A =
∫
E
(∫
C
‖f(e)− fρ(e)‖2 dρ(c|e)
)
dρE
=
∫
E
(
‖f(e)− fρ(e)‖2
∫
C
dρ(c|e)
)
dρE
=
∫
E
‖f(e)− fρ(e)‖2 dρE .
For the second term we have
B =
∫
E
(∫
C
〈f(e)− fρ(e), fρ(e)− c〉C dρ(c|e)
)
dρE
=
∫
E
〈f(e)− fρ(e), fρ(e)−
∫
C
cdρ(c|e)〉C dρE
=
∫
E
〈f(e)− fρ(e), fρ(e)− fρ(e)〉dρE = 0.

As a consequence of the proposition 4, the regression function fρ minimizes the mean square
error ε.
Definition 16. Let fF be the target function that minimizes ε:
fF ∈ arg min
f∈F
ε(f).
During the learning phase, the probability measure ρ is not assumed to be known. The
learning process is a minimisation procedure on a sample S = ((e1, c1), ..., (em, cm)), m ∈ N∗.
Definition 17. We define the empirical error εS of f on the sample S by
εS(f) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
‖f(ei)− ci‖2 dρ,
and fS the empirical target function, namely a minimizer of εS:
fS ∈ arg min
f∈F
εS(f).
This minimizer is of course not unique. Nevertheless, when the size m of the sample is large
enough, the empirical target function will approximate the target function. More precisely, one
has the following classical concentration inequality from [13]:
Proposition 5. We assume that:
(1) F is a compact and convex set;
(2) there exists M ∈ R∗+, such that for all f ∈ F , ‖f(e)− c‖C ≤M almost everywhere;
(3) ρ is a probability measure on Z.
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Then for all η > 0,
Prob
{∫
E
‖fS(e)− fF (e)‖2C dρE ≤ η
}
≥ 1−N (F , η
24M
)e
−mη
288M2
where N (F , s) is the so-called covering number, namely the minimal l ∈ N such that there
exist l disks in F with radius s covering F . Since F is compact, this number is finite.
We can now get back to our model. We recall that the probability measure ρi,t allows to draw
the sample for the learning of the individual i at time t, and that τ = 0. The probability measure
ρi,t then depends only on social learning. During the learning phase of our model we have :
fρi,t(e) =
∫
C
cdρ(c|e)
=
N∑
j=1
Λtij
∫
C
c1kj(e)=c dc
=
N∑
j=1
Λtijkj(e) dc.
Since F is convex, fρi,t ∈ F . If E is finite, or in the other case, if F is a set a continuous
functions, we have f i,tF = fρi,t with f
i,t
F being the minimiser of the error ε with ρ = ρ
i,t.
3.5. Main result. Combining our results on the one-step idealistic process, together with the
ones on learning theory, we are able to study the convergence of the full process kt with high
probability.
We recall thatMF = {(k, ..., k), k ∈ F}.
Theorem 2. We suppose that τ = 0, Γ > 0, cmin > 0, and F is compact and convex. There
exist some constants α∗ < 1, M > 0, and A ≥ 0 such that for each 0 < δ < 1, and t ≥ 0, if the
sample size m ≥ mt = mt
(MF , k0,M, α∗, δ), then
d(kt,MF ) ≤ Aαt∗ d(k0,MF ),
with confidence at least 1− δ.
Proof. Let d be the distance defined in corollary 1.
We recall that the application T : F ×N 7→ F is defined by T (f, t) = Λtf . Let KtT = T (kt, t).
Notice in particular that the process KtT is different from k
t. By the triangle inequality we have,
using (3.3) and (3.2), that
d(kt,MF ) ≤ d(kt,KtT ) + d(KtT ,MF ).
The contractivity of the second term is yielded by Theorem 1: there exists αt < 1 such that
d(KtT ,MF ) ≤ αtd(kt−1T ,MF ).
Now, we need to estimate the other term. We recall that E is compact in RN . By the
compactness of E and F we have that
sup
f∈F,e∈E
‖f(e)‖C <∞.
In particular, there exists M > 0 such that
max
(e,c)∈E×C,f∈F
‖f(e)− c‖C ≤M
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Using Proposition 5, for each η > 0 and i ∈ {1, ..., N},
(3.7) Prob
{∫
E
‖kti(e)−KtT ,i(e)‖2C dρi ≤ η
}
≥ 1−N (F , η
24M
)e
−mη
288M2 .
Let us now define the norm ‖ · ‖FNρ on FN by:
‖F‖FNρ =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
∫
E
‖Fi(e)‖2C dρi, for all F ∈ FN .
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , one has:
(3.8)
∫
E
‖kti(e)−KtT ,i(e)‖2C dρi ≤ η =⇒
N∑
i=1
∫
E
‖kti(e)−KtT ,i(e)‖2C dρi ≤ Nη.
In particular,
∪Ni=1
{∫
E
‖kti(e)−KtT ,i(e)‖2C dρi ≤ η
}
⊂ {‖kt −KtT ‖FNρ ≤ Nη}.
Thus, gathering (3.7) and (3.8), and using the convexity of the exponential,
Prob
{
‖kt −KtT ‖FNρ ≤ Nη}
}
≥ Prob
{
∪Ni=1{
∫
E
‖kti(e)−KtT ,i(e)‖2C dρi ≤ η}
}
≥ (1−N (F , η
24M
)e
−mη
288M2 )N
≥ 1−NN (F , η
24M
)e
−mη
288M2 .(3.9)
Let dFNρ be the distance on FN defined by the norm ‖ · ‖FNρ . For all f and g in FN , we have:
dFNρ (f, g)
2 =
N∑
i=1
∫
E
‖fi(e)− gi(e)‖2C dρi =
∫
E
‖f(e)− g(e)‖2A dρi,
with
‖x‖2A =
N∑
i=1
‖xi‖2C ∀x ∈ (Rl)N .
For all f and g in FN we also have:
d(f, g)2 =
∫
E
l∑
i=1
‖((f1(e)− g1(e))l, . . . , (fN (e)− gN (e))l)‖2C dρi
=
∫
E
‖f(e)− g(e)‖2B dρi,
with
‖x‖2B =
l∑
i=1
‖((x1(e))l, . . . , (fN (e)− gN (e))l)‖2, ∀x ∈ (Rl)N .
All the norm being equivalent on (Rl)N , there exist C ′A and CA such that
C ′A‖x‖B ≤ ‖x‖A ≤ CA‖x‖B , ∀x ∈ (Rl)N .
Hence,
C ′Ad(f, g) ≤ dFN (f,g) ≤ CAd(f, g), ∀lf, g ∈ F .
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Using (3.9) with confidence at least 1−NN (F , η24M )e
−mη
288M2 , we finally have
d(kt,MF ) ≤ CA
√
Nη + αtd(k
t−1,MF ).
Iterating on the discrete times, one has with confidence at least 1− tNN (F , η24M )e
−mη
288M2 that
d(kt,MF ) ≤ CA
√
Nη
t−1∑
i=0
i∏
j=1
αj
+ t∏
i=1
αid(k
0,MF ).
Let α∗ = maxi=0,...,N maxt αi(t). According to Lemma 3, one has α∗ < 1, yielding that
d(kt,MF ) ≤ CA
√
Nη
(
1 + α+ . . .+ α
t−1
∗
)
+ αt∗d(k
0,MF ).
≤ CA
1− α∗
√
Nη + αt∗d(k
0,MF ).
Thus, for any 0 < δ < 1, choosing the parameter m such that
(3.10) m ≥ 288M
2
η
(
ln
(
tNN (F , η24M
δ
))
,
yields with confidence at least 1− δ that
d(kt,MF ) ≤ CA
1− α∗
√
Nη + αt∗d(k
0,MF ).
Taking η = α2t∗ d(k0,MF )2/N finishes the proof. 
Remark 6. When time t goes to infinity, so does the number of sample mt needed for the
convergence in Theorem 2 to occur.
Indeed, using Section 7.1 of [5], there exists CF > 0 and a > 0 such that
lnN (F , ) ≤ CF
(
1

)a
.
Plugging this into (3.10) yields that
mt ≤ 288NM
2
(1− α∗)2α2t∗ d(k0,MF )2
ln
(
tNCF
(
24NM
(1− α∗)2α2t∗ d(k0,MF )2
)a
+ ln
(
1
δ
))
≤ 288NM
2
(1− α∗)2α2t∗ d(k0,MF )2
(
ln (tN) + CF
(
24NM
(1− α∗)2α2t∗ d(k0,MF )2
)a
+ ln
(
1
δ
))
Choosing appropriately δ as a function of t, one can show that f t tends to MF almost surely.
One can then define the minimal sampling size m(t) by
m(t) =
288NM2
(1− α∗)2α2t∗ d(k0,MF )2
(
ln (t2N) + CF
(
24NM
(1− α∗)2α2t∗ d(k0,MF )2
)a)
,
which tends to +∞ when t→ +∞.
Corollary 4. Let f tm be the process at the t when the size of the sample in the dynamics is m.
One has that
sup
>0
lim
t→∞Prob
{
d(f tm(t),MF ) ≤ 
}
= 1
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Proof. Let  > 0. For all t big enough, one has
Aαt∗d(f
0
m(t),MF ) < .
Taking δ = 1t yields
Prob
{
d(f tm(t),MF ) ≤ 
}
≥ 1− 1
t
.

4. Numerical simulations
Let us now both illustrate the mathematical results of the paper, such as Theorem 2, and
show that some generalizations also hold when individual learning is possible (τ > 0). Individual
learning allows innovations, new experiences and observations, and original conceptualizations
which make possible the evolution of knowledge for both the individuals and the population.
By analogy, individual learning plays the same role for the evolution of knowledge than genetic
mutations for the biological evolution of species [11].
4.1. Illustration of the main theorem. Our model aims to be used by theoretical anthropol-
ogists. To show its usefulness, we illustrate the results of our main theorem in specific cases.
Test 1. Impact of self-inertia. As a first numerical test, we aim to illustrate Theorem 2. Let
E = {1, ..., 5} and C = [−10, 10]. We consider a relationship between two individuals (labeled 1
and 2). The structure matrix 3 is given by
Γ =
(
α 1− α
1− α α
)
,
where α ∈ [0, 1].
The parameter α can be interpreted as cognitive (see Remark 2) or self-inertia. The higher
the α, the less individuals’ knowledge-like functions change along the dynamics. As likelihood
landscape (4), we take L(e, c) = 1 for all e ∈ E and c ∈ C\{0}, and take cmin = 0.1. We define F
as the set of continuous functions from E to C so F is convex. As E contains a finite number of
elements and C is compact, then F is compact. We set τ = 0 so the dynamics is only driven by
social learning.
When α varies in (0, 1), all the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are met (even though, strictly speak-
ing, we do not illustrate exactly the theorem because we cannot compute mt). Our numerical
simulations show that according to this result the population converges to a common shared
knowledge.
At the initial state, the knowledge-like functions of individuals 1 and 2 are k01 and k02, respec-
tively, given by
k01(e) = 2 ∀e ∈ E , k02(e) = 6 ∀e ∈ E .
Let d be the distance defined in Corollary 1. By using numerical simulations we follow the evo-
lution of d(kt,MF ) through time for different values of the parameter α. We ran 100 simulation
replicates. The mean dynamics is presented in Figure 6.
When α 6= 1 the population rapidly converges to a common shared knowledge (Fig. 6) as
predicted by Theorem 2. We notice that this convergence is exponential, as expected given that
the process is driven by an inhomogeneous Markov chain. We notice that the convergence is
faster when α = 0.5.
When α = 1 the matrix does not respect the hypothesis of Theorem 2 since γ12 = γ21 = 0.
It corresponds to the case where the individuals do not communicate with each other. Thus
individuals knowledge-like functions do not vary through time, and the process does not converge
towards a common shared knowledge.
20 SYLVAIN BILLIARD, MAXIME DEREX, LUDOVIC MAISONNEUVE, AND THOMAS REY
0 10 20 30 40 50
10−2
10−1
100
101
t
d
(k
t
,M
F
)
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.2
α = 0.3
α = 0.4
α = 0.5
α = 0.6
α = 0.7
α = 0.8
α = 0.9
α = 1.0
Figure 6. Test 1. Evolution of the distance between kt and the set F through time.
Test 2. A professor and its audience.
Now let us consider a population of 5 individuals: 1 professor (1) and 4 students (2, 3, 4,
5). We keep the same setting as previously, namely no individual learning (τ = 0), since it is a
purely teaching situation.
Let the structure matrix be
Γ =

1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
 .
At the initial state, knowledge-like functions are defined by:
k01(e) = 5 ∀e ∈ E ,
and
k0i (e) = 1 ∀e ∈ E ,∀i ∈ {2, . . . , 5},
so at the initial time, all students have the same knowledge.
We consider two cases. First, the likelihood landscape is assumed constant. Second, it is
considered concave assuming the concept c is fixed: we set for all (e, c) ∈ E × C\{0}
L(e, c) = e
(e−6)2
10 ,
so the professor has a knowledge-like function that is more likely than that one of her students.
We call keq the common shared knowledge at the equilibrium. We define ∆i as the distance
between the initial knowledge of individual i and the common shared knowledge. We have
∆i = dC(k0i , keq),
with dC the distance induced by the inner product on C.
We ran 100 numerical simulations as previously. Results are shown in Figures 7(a) and 7(b).
Figure 7(a) shows the evolution of the distance to space F with time. In both cases, whether
the likelihood landscape is fixed or concave, the population rapidly converges to a common shared
knowledge. When the likelihood landscape is concave, the professor has a strong influence on
her students and the convergence to a common shared knowledge is faster.
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Figure 7. Test 2.(a) Evolution of the distance between kt and the set F
through time. (b) ∆i for each individual i in the population. The blue crosses
represent the case where the likelihood is constant, and the orange pluses show
the case where the likelihood is concave.
Figure 7(b) shows the values of ∆·. In both cases, the common shared knowledge is close
to the professor’s initial one. This common shared knowledge is farther from the students’
initial knowledge than from the professor’s. When the likelihood landscape favors the professor
influence, the common shared knowledge is closer to the initial professor knowledge.
4.2. Creation of knowledge. We now consider the case where individual learning is present,
namely τ > 0. Although we couldn’t prove a convergence result for this case, we can still use
numerical approaches when the parameters of the model do not allow analytical resolution.
Test 3. Creation of knowledge among interacting individuals. In this part we set E = {1, ..., 25}
and C = R. We define the likelihood landscape as
L(e, c) =
{
1
2 if c = 0,
exp−(x− 1)2 otherwise,
such that the function 1F is defined as:
∀e ∈ E, 1F (e) = 1,
is the most likely function. We consider a population of ten individuals and we set a initial state
where K0 = (0F , ..., 0F ). Let Γ be the square matrix of size N full of 1. Thus at the initial
state, individuals are "newborn", that is, they do have not conceptualized any experiences. We
investigate convergence of knowledge towards the function 1F and its dynamics by simulation
runs.
We define the relative entropy (RE) of the population as
(4.1) RE(t) = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
dF (kti , 1F ),
with for all f , g in F ,
(4.2) dF (f, g) =
√√√√NE∑
e=1
(f(e)− g(e))2
NE
.
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Figure 8. Test 3. Evolution of the relative entropy through time.
When every individual in the population has 1F as knowledge-like function, the relative entropy
is maximal and equals 0. We use the relative entropy as a measure of knowledge in the population
i.e. the higher the relative entropy, the more likely the individuals’ knowledge. This allows us to
quantify the effect of parameters on the evolution of knowledge. Figure 8 shows that the relative
entropy increases with time.
In simulations, the individual learning rate τ = 0.02. Individual learning results in new experi-
ences and observations, while social learning promotes the spread of adequate conceptualizations.
The combined effect of individual and social learning allows the population to evolve towards
better solutions (Figure 9).
4.3. Comparison with a language model. Cucker, Smale and Zhou developed a model to
describe the evolution of language [5]. Our work is stongly inspired by their work. For our
purpose, we needed to substantially modify this model by introducing the credibility matrix and
individual learning. However, interpretation of the variables of the model is different: in their
model a language-like function is a function from a space of objects to a space of signals. As
in our case, they proved the convergence of the languages of different individuals to a common
shared language, although under different hypotheses (see also Remark 5).
In their model, influences between individuals do not vary through time. In reality, we expect
influences between individuals to be dynamic, and that is why we introduced the credibility
matrix which changes at each time step and modifies the interactions within the population.
Test 4. On the evolution of language. We modified our numerical method in order to simulate the
model of language evolution developed in [5]. We consider two different linguistic communities of
two individuals with few interactions. We take E = {1, ..., 5} and C = [−10, 10]. The individuals
of the first and the second communities have the language-like function k1 and k2, respectively.
Where k1 and k2 correspond to two different languages. This language-like function is defined as
∀e ∈ E , k1(e) = 5,
and
∀e ∈ E , k2(e) = 7.
We take
Γ =

1 1 0.01 0.01
1 1 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 1 1
0.01 0.01 1 1
 ,
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Figure 9. Test 3. Knowledge-like functions for every individuals in the pop-
ulation at different given times.
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so the two linguistic communities hardly interact. Numerical simulations show that the two
communities converge to a common shared language: Figure 10 shows that the distance between
the process kt and the set F tends to 0.
0 100 200 300 400
10−2
10−1
100
t
d(
kt
,M
F)
Figure 10. Test 4. Evolution of the distance between kt and the set F through time.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this work was to develop a more general mathematical model of knowledge evo-
lution than the existing ones e.g. [8, 14]. Existing models have been widely used to investigate
the impact of population size on the evolution of knowledge. However, they rely on strong as-
sumptions and omit important aspects of social dynamics. Here, we developed a hybrid model,
between an individual based stochastic model and a learning algorithm, that relaxes hypotheses
and incorporates various forms of social interaction dynamics.
Analytical results show that interacting individuals converge with high probability towards a
common shared knowledge, when no innovation occurs (i.e. no individual learning). Numerical
simulations show that these results hold when individuals combine individual and social learning
and that conceptualizations that appropriately reflect the structure of the world emerge across
time. This model can be used to investigate knowledge evolution in hierarchically or spatially
structured populations of variable sizes.
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